Joint Analysis of the Discount Factor and Payoff Parameters in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models by Komarova, Tatiana et al.
Joint Analysis of the Discount Factor and Payo¤
Parameters in Dynamic Discrete Choice Modelsy
Tatiana Komarova
London School of Economics
Fabio Sanches
PUC-Rio
Daniel Silva Junior
City University of London
Sorawoot Srisuma
University of Surrey
November 5, 2017
Abstract
Most empirical and theoretical econometric studies of dynamic discrete choice models as-
sume the discount factor to be known. We show the knowledge of the discount factor is not
necessary to identify parts, or even all, of the payo¤ function. We show the discount factor can
be generically identied jointly with the payo¤ parameters. On the other hand it is known the
payo¤ function cannot be nonparametrically identied without any a priori restrictions. Our
identication of the discount factor is robust to any normalization choice on the payo¤ para-
meters. In IO applications normalizations are usually made on switching costs, such as entry
costs and scrap values. We also show that switching costs can be nonparametrically identied,
in closed-form, independently of the discount factor and other parts of the payo¤ function. Our
identication strategies are constructive. They lead to easy to compute estimands that are
global solutions. We illustrate with a Monte Carlo study and the dataset used in Ryan (2012).
JEL Classification Numbers: C14, C25, C51
Keywords: Discount Factor, Dynamic Discrete Choice Problem, Identication, Estimation,
Switching Costs
We are grateful to the Editor and three anonymous referees for their suggestions that led to many improvements on
the paper. We also thank Kirill Evdokimov, Emmanuel Guerre, Koen Jochmans, Arthur Lewbel, Oliver Linton, Aureo
de Paula, Martin Pesendorfer, Yuya Sasaki, Richard Spady, Pasquale Schiraldi and seminar participants at CREATES,
GRIPS, Johns Hopkins University, LSE, NUS, Queen Mary University of London, Stony Brook University, University
of Cambridge, University of São Paulo, and participants at Bristol Econometrics Study Group (2014), AMES (Taipei),
EMES (Toulouse) and IAAE (London) for comments and discussions.
yE-mail address: t.komarova@lse.ac.uk; fmiessi@gmail.com; d.silva-junior@lse.ac.uk; s.srisuma@surrey.ac.uk.
1
1 Introduction
The stationary dynamic discrete decision model surveyed in Rust (1994) has been a subject of much
research in econometric theory and empirical studies. The primitives of the model consist of the
period payo¤ function, Markov transition law, and discount factor. A well-known characteristic of
a dynamic decision model is that it is not identied. For example, Manski (1993) points out in
general that the discount factor and payo¤ function cannot be jointly identied nonparametrically.
Most positive identication results in the literature until recently focus on identifying payo¤ para-
meters while assuming other primitives to be known; e.g. see Magnac and Thesmar (2002), and also
Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) and Bajari, Chernozhukov, Hong and Nekipelov (2009).
Meanwhile empirical studies typically parameterize the payo¤ function, parameterize at least part of
the distribution of the variables, and assume the discount factor to be known.
In this paper we are interested in identifying the discount factor jointly with the payo¤ function
under the linear-in-parameter specication. This parametric model is the most commonly used
specication in practice. When there are nite states the linear specication can represent any
nonparametric function. Most empirical studies assume the value of the discount factor to be known
without any formal justication in this setting. To the best of our knowledge we are not aware of any
prior identication study involving the discount factor in a general parametric model. We provide
conditions under which both the discount factor and payo¤parameters can be identied, and propose
an easy to compute estimator for them. Other positive identication results on the discount factor in
the literature use a nonparametric approach. They use exclusion restrictions in the form of variables
a¤ecting future utilities but not current utilities to identify the discount factor; e.g. see Dubé, Hitsch,
and Jindal (2014), Wang (2014), Fang and Wang (2015), and Ching and Osborne (2017). We do not
rely on these assumptions.
A nonparametric payo¤ function without any restriction cannot be identied even if the discount
factor is known. The fundamental identication characteristic in a discrete choice model can be
traced to the static random utility model of McFadden (1974), where utility is ordinal and its level
cannot be identied. Some form of normalization has to be made. Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014,
AS hereafter) recently highlight the undesirable e¤ects that an arbitrary normalization have on
un-normalized parameters and counterfactual studies, and emphasize the importance of identiable
objects without any normalization; also see Kalouptsidi, Scott, and Souza-Rodrigues (2016a, 2016b).
An important question then is whether our identication result is robust against misspecifying the
normalization choice.
We verify that our identication of the discount factor is robust against any normalization choice.
On the other hand the payo¤ parameters are generally not individually robust. But some of their
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meaningful combinations are. To this end we also contribute to the literature by providing a non-
parametric framework to identify the payo¤ parameters that arise from changing in the actions of
players between time periods. We call these switching costs1. For example, in an entry/exit model,
they are entry cost and scrap value. Individually the entry cost and scrap value cannot be separately
identied but their di¤erence, namely the sunk entry cost, can be identied. We show that switching
costs can be written explicitly in terms of the observed choice probabilities, independently of the
discount factor as well as other (non switching costs) components of the payo¤ function. AS has
already shown the sunk entry costs in several IO models can be identied in this fashion. We extend
these results to sunk investment costs that can arise from rm investing and divesting, as well as
individual switching costs themselves under other a priori restrictions.
A general discussion on the non-identication of the dynamic model we consider can be found in
Rust (1994). Positive identication is possible when more structures are imposed on the primitives.
Magnac and Thesmar (2002) have shown the problem of identifying the payo¤ parameters nonpara-
metrically when all other primitives of the model are assumed to be known can be reduced to a
study of solutions to a linear system; also see Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) and Bajari et
al. (2009). We are interested in the payo¤ parameters as well as the discount factor. The discount
factor enters the decision problem recursively and thereby introduces nonlinearity in the model.
Magnac and Thesmar (2002, Section 4.2) suggest that exclusion or parametric restrictions can be
used to identify the discount factor. For the former, their Proposition 4 illustrates in a simple two-
period model the discount factor is in fact typically overidentied. The identifying restriction they
use is that: for some states, utilities in the rst period are the same but di¤er in the second period.
This idea has been elaborated and applied in di¤erent empirical contexts by Dubé et al. (2014),
Wang (2014), Fang and Wang (2015), and Ching and Osborne (2017) amongst others. On the other
hand, while it may be plausible to assume identication is possible in a parametric model we are not
aware of any theoretical result that has veried this to be true. In particular establishing parametric
identication in a general nonlinear model is a non-trivial task; see Komunjer (2012) for a recent
illustration. We prove identication using an empirical model that is linear in the payo¤ parameters
conditioning on the discount factor. We construct a one-dimensional criterion function to be used
for identication. It exploits the conditional linear structure to prole out the payo¤ parameters
and reduce the nonlinear nature of the problem to just one dimension. The criterion function we
construct to establish identication has a sample counterpart that can be used for estimation.
In many IO applications, switching costs are often the essence of a dynamic decision problem and
1We use the term switching costs that shares the same spirit as generic adjustment costs and other inertia. Examples
of usages in various elds of economics and marketing include the cost to change in health insurance plan, changing
of credit and other utility providers, and retailers decisions on promotions.
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can even be the central object of the dynamic model itself (e.g. see Slade (1998), and also the general
discussions in Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry and Pakes (2007) and Pesendorfer (2010)). Our study on
the switching costs takes a nonparametric approach. We identify combinations of the switching costs
by exploiting empirically motivated exclusion and testable independence assumptions. A key step
involves eliminating common future expected discounted payo¤s that arise from di¤erent states. Our
result does not depend on the discount factor and some other components of the payo¤ function.
The robust identication result of this nature has precedence in the literature but has not been
highlighted.2 For example, an inspection of Proposition 2 in Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014) will
reveal that the same implication of our Theorem 2 has already been obtained for a binary action
game of entry/exit3. We provide closed-form expressions for switching costs and their combinations in
terms of only the observed choice probabilities. They can therefore be trivially estimated. They also
suggest overidentication tests can be constructed by comparing against other estimates of switching
costs obtained under additional assumptions on the model primitives.
Throughout the paper our identication results are obtained using an empirical model under the
assumption that the choice and transition probabilities are nonparametrically identied. These same
probabilities are used to compute expected payo¤s in a pseudo-decision problem for all values of the
model parameters as opposed to the actual (or full-solution) model where equilibrium probabilities
are used. The choice probabilities implied by our empirical model can be used to construct pseudo-
likelihood functions as done in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002, 2007) and Kasahara and Shimotsu
(2008). This empirical model is used because it is tractable. It forms the basis for any two-step esti-
mation procedures, following Hotz and Miller (1993), which are preferred on computational grounds
over a full-solution approach such as the nested xed-point algorithm of Rust (1987). The estimator
we propose in this paper will be based on the two-step approach of Sanches, Silva, and Srisuma
(2016) with computational simplicity in mind. It is worth noting that, although consistent, a simple
two-step estimator like ours tend to have larger nite sample bias and is less e¢ cient than estima-
tors that enforce the equilibrium restriction of the model. Equilibrium constraints can be imposed
during estimation with additional computational cost, also without the need to solve out a dynamic
optimization problem (cf. Rust (1987)). E.g. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002, 2007) and Egesdal,
Lai, and Su (2015) have shown the fully e¢ cient maximum likelihood estimator can be obtained in
this way.
When the data come from a single time series, or when they are pooled across short panels of
2In one instance, for a slightly di¤erent model with a mixed continuous-discrete decision variable, Hong and Shum
(2010) rely on a deterministic state transition rule to dene a pairwise-di¤erence estimator that matches on (and
thereby avoid computing) future expected discounted payo¤s from di¤erent states.
3We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.
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multiple homogeneous markets, the choice and transition probabilities are nonparametrically iden-
tied under weak conditions. In practice many datasets are short panels, where it would be more
reasonable to assume some form of unobserved heterogeneity exists across markets. A exible yet
tractable way to model unobserved heterogeneity in this literature is to use a nite mixture model.
For example Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) suggest economic agentspayo¤s have time-invariant
unobserved market specic component that is unobserved to the econometrician, therefore markets
of di¤erent types have di¤erent equilibrium distributions on the observables. Kasahara and Shimotsu
(2009) and Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) have given conditions so that the probabilities for each
mixture type can be nonparametrically identied under di¤erent frameworks, thereby extending the
scope of applying two-step estimation methods to models with unobserved heterogeneity. All iden-
tication results in our paper are valid in such setting as long as we can identify the type specic
probabilities to be able to set up the corresponding pseudo-decision problem. Specically the degree
of overidentication on the model primitives increases proportionally to the number of mixture types.
The class of decision problems we consider is a special case of dynamic games described in
Aguirregabiria and Nevo (2010) and Bajari, Hong, and Nekipelov (2010). All of our intuition and
results are applicable to these games. The most parts of this paper focus on the single agent model
for notational simplicity and clarity of idea, and to abstract ourselves away from game specic issues
(such as multiple equilibria). For the same reasoning given for models with unobserved heterogeneity,
the portability of our results to dynamic games is immediate as long as the choice and transition
probabilities can be consistently estimated nonparametrically. The numerical studies of our proposed
estimators are in fact performed in a dynamic game setting. The details on extending our single
agents results to games can be found in the Appendix.
We perform a Monte Carlo study of our proposed estimators using the simulation design in
Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008). We then use the same dataset as used in Ryan (2012)
to estimate a dynamic game played between rms in the US Portland cement industry. In our
version of the game, rms choose whether to enter the market as well as decide on the capacity
level of operation (ve di¤erent levels). We assume rms compete in a capacity constrained Cournot
game, so the period variable prot can be estimated directly from the data as done in Ryan. The
dynamic parameters we estimate are the discount factor, xed operating cost, and 25 switching cost
parameters. We estimate the model twice. Once using the data from before 1990 and once after
1990. The separation date coincides with implementation of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
(1990 CAAA). Our estimates on switching costs generally appear sensible, having correct signs and
relative magnitudes. They show that rms entering the market with a higher capacity level incur
larger costs, and suggest that increasing capacity level is generally costly while a reduction can return
some revenue. We nd that operating and entry costs are generally higher after the 1990 CAAA,
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which supports Ryans key nding. We are also able to estimate the discount factor to be within the
commonly assumed range with a reasonable precision.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical model and
the basic modeling assumptions. Section 3 gives a joint identication result on the discount factor and
the payo¤ parameters under the linear-in-parameter specication. Section 4 studies nonparametric
identication of the switching costs. Section 5 illustrates the performance and use of our estimator
with simulated and real data. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains details for extending our
identication results to dynamic games and further results on identifying the discount factor.
Notations. We use  (A) ; CS (A) ;A>;A 1 and Ay to respectively denote the rank, column
space, transpose, inverse and Moore-Penrose inverse of matrix A. For any positive integers p; q, we
let Ip and 0pq respectively denote the identity matrix of size p and a p q matrix of zeros.
2 Basic Modelling Framework
We begin by describing an innite time horizon dynamic discrete choice model as in Rust (1987,
1994).4 Given our empirical examples and application below, we shall sometimes refer to our rep-
resentative economic agent as a rm and her payo¤s as prots. Let t 2 f1; 2; : : : ;1g denote time.
The random variables in our model are the action and state variables, which we denote by at and
st respectively. at takes values from a nite set of alternatives A = f0; 1; : : : ; Jg. st contains two
components, st  (xt; "t) 2 X  RJ+1 with X  R. xt is public information to both the rm and
the econometrician, while "t  ("t (0) ; : : : ; "t (J)) 2 RJ+1 is private information only observed by the
rm. Future states are uncertain. Todays action and states a¤ect outcomes for states in the future.
The evolution of the states is summarized by a Markov transition law P (st+1jst; at). The rms
period payo¤ function is u (at; st) 2 R. Future periods payo¤s are discounted at the rate  2 [0; 1).
At time t the rm observes st and chooses an action optimally. Specically, we assume at =  (st)
so that:
 (s) = arg max
a2A
fu (a; s) + E [V (st+1) jst = s; at = a]g; (1)
where V (s) = max
a2A
fu (a; s) + E [V (st+1) jst = s; at = a]g :
Using the optimal decision rule we can remove the max operator and write the value function as,
V (s) = E
" 1X
t=0
tu (at; st) js0 = s
#
: (2)
4The notations for an innite time stationary model is much simpler relative to a nite time horizon one. Our
identication strategy is valid for nite time horizon models, and with or without absorbing states.
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The expectation operators in the displays above integrate out variables with respect to the probability
distribution induced by the equilibrium choice probabilities and Markov transition law. As standard
in the literature we assume the following assumptions.
Assumption M:
(i) (Additive Separability) For all a; x; ":
u (a; x; ") =  (a; x) + " (a) :
(ii) (Conditional Independence) The transition distribution of the states has the following factor-
ization for all x0; "0; x; "; a:
P (x0; "0jx; "; a) = Q ("0)G (x0jx; a) ;
where Q is the cumulative distribution function of "t and G denotes the transition law of xt+1
conditioning on xt; at. Furthermore, "t has nite rst moments, and a positive, continuous and
bounded density on RJ+1.
(iii) (Finite Observed State) X = f1; : : : ; Kg.
The primitives of the model under this setting consist of (; ;Q;G). Throughout the paper
we shall assume (G;Q) to be known. G can be identied from the data when (at; xt; xt+1) are
observed. Consistent estimation of the joint distribution of (at; xt; xt+1) holds under weak conditions
with a single time series, as well as repeated observations from short panels when there is no other
unobserved heterogeneity. Q is typically assumed known in most empirical applications. Conditions
for the identication of Q exist when xt is a continuous variable using a large support type argument,
e.g. see Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014, Proposition 1), Buchholz, Shum, and Xu (2016, Lemma 4)
and Chen (2014, Theorem 4). Our results do not depend on any continuity assumption to achieve
identication as we take xt to be a discrete random variable.
Our subsequent analysis use the fact that we can identify the choice probability from data as
the starting point, which in turn is informative about (; ). More specically, for any a > 0, let
v (a; x)  v (a; x)  v (0; x), where v (a; x) denotes the choice-specic value function that serves as
the mean utility in a discrete choice modelling:
v (a; x) =  (a; x) + E [V (st+1) jxt = x; at = a] ; (3)
Pr [at = ajxt = x] = Pr [v (a; x) v (a0; x) > "t (a0)  "t (a) for all a0 6= a] :
By inverting the choice probabilities (Hotz and Miller (1993)) we can recoverv (a; x) for all a > 0; x.
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3 Identifying the Discount Factor with Linear-in-Parameter
Payo¤s
In this section we assume the payo¤ function takes on a linear-in-parameter specication. Section
3.1 denes the identication concept for the discount factor and payo¤ parameters. Section 3.2
provides some representation lemmas that will be useful for dening a criterion function to study
identication. Section 3.3 gives the identication result.
3.1 Denition of Parametric Identication
We will assume Assumption M and the following assumption throughout this section.
Assumption P (Linear-in-Parameter): For all a; x:
 (a; x; ) = 0 (a; x) + 
>1 (a; x) ,
where 0 is a known real value function, 1 is a known p dimensional vector value function and 
belongs to Rp.
Assumption P can be interpreted as nonparametric. For example it can represent an unrestricted
nonparametric function of  by assigning a parameter for each possible pair of a and x. However,
such function is too rich and cannot be identied. We will maintain the parametric appearance for 
as we will not be exploiting any nonparametric restriction in our identication study of the discount
factor.
The role of 0 is to represent the payo¤ components that are identiable without the knowledge
of the discount factor or other model primitives. In practice 0 and possibly parts of 1 may have to
be estimated (e.g. see Section 5.2). For the purpose of identication they can be treated as known.
The primitives in this setting are (; ). They belong to B   where B = [0; 1) and  = Rp. We
are interested in the data generating discount factor and payo¤ parameters, which we denote by 0
and 0 respectively.
We begin by dening the parametric choice-specic value function (cf. equation (3)):
v (a; x; ; ) 
1X
t=0
tE [ (at; xt; ) + "t (at) ja0 = a; x0 = x] : (4)
Then we denote the di¤erences in these value functions when action a is chosen relative to action
0 by v (a; x; ; )  v (a; x; ; )   v (0; x; ; ). It is important to emphasize that the stochastic
process fat; xt; "tg1t=0 that denes the right hand side of equation (4) follows an optimal controlled
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process consistent with (0; 0), whose distribution is identied by the observed probabilities from the
data. Therefore v (a; x; ; ) is identied for all (a; x) 2 A X and (; ) 2 B  . Furthermore,
v (a; x; 0; 0) is also identied by Hotz-Millers inversion. We shall use the mapping (; ) 7 !
fv (a; x; ; )g(a;x)2AX as a basis of our identication study.
More formally, we take each pair (; ) to be a structure of our empirical model and its implied
choice-specic values, denoted by V;  fv (a; x; ; )g(a;x)2AX , to be its corresponding reduced
form. We then dene identication using the notion of observational equivalence in terms of the
di¤erences in expected payo¤s.
Definition I1 (Observational Equivalence): Any distinct (; ) and (0; 0) in B  are
observationally equivalent if and only if V; = V0;0 .
Definition I2 (Point Identification): An element in B, say (; ), is point identied if
and only if (0; 0) and (; ) are not observationally equivalent for all (0; 0) 6= (; ) in B .
For our identication study we dene our statistical model to be the collection of all reduced forms,
namely: fV;g(;)2B. All statements made on identication in Section 3 are in the context of this
statistical model unless explicitly stated otherwise. Alternatively we can also dene a statistical
model based on probability distributions as in the traditional econometrics studies on identication.
Specically, the model implied choice probabilities for each (; ) are:
P;  fPr [v (a; x; ; ) v (a0; x; ; ) > " (a0)  " (a) for all a0 6= a]g(a;x)2AX :
It is known there is a one-to-one relation between fV;g(;)2B and fP;g(;)2B; see Matzkin
(1991), Hotz and Miller (1993), and Norets and Takahashi (2013). Therefore identication for our
decision problem can be equivalently established with either fV;g(;)2B or fP;g(;)2B. Note
that one can interpret elements in P; as the implied choice probabilities for an economic agent
who solves a pseudo-decision problem where the expected payo¤ for taking each action is given by
equation (4).
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3.2 Some Representation Lemmas
Under Assumptions M and P, it shall be useful to separate out the contributions of the expected
discounted payo¤s in (4) as follows:
v (a; x; ; ) = 0 (a; x) + 
1X
t=0
tE [0 (at; xt) ja0 = a; x0 = x]
+
1X
t=0
tE ["t (at) ja0 = a; x0 = x]
+>(1 (a; x) + 
1X
t=0
tE [1 (at; xt) ja0 = a; x0 = x]):
Subsequently, by dening l (a; x)  l (a; x)  l (0; x) for l = 0; 1, we have:
v (a; x; ; ) = 0 (a; x) + 
1X
t=0
t (E [0 (at; xt) ja0 = a; x0 = x]  E [0 (at; xt) ja0 = 0; x0 = x])
+
1X
t=0
t (E ["t (at) ja0 = a; x0 = x]  E ["t (at) ja0 = 0; x0 = x])
+>(1 (a; x) + 
1X
t=0
t (E [1 (at; xt) ja0 = a; x0 = x]  E [1 (at; xt) ja0 = 0; x0 = x])):
The decomposition of v helps us distinguish how  and/or  a¤ect di¤erent parts of the per-period
payo¤s. Lemma 1 summarizes this in a matrix form.
Lemma 1: Under Assumptions M and P, for all a > 0, v (a; x; ; ) can be collected in the
following vector form for all (; ) 2 B :
va (; ) = Ra0 + H
a (IK   L) 1 R0 (5)
+Ha (IK   L) 1 
+
 
Ra1 + H
a (IK   L) 1 R1

;
where the elements in the above display are collected and explained in Tables A and B.
Matrix Dimension Representing
Ra1 K  p 1 (a; )
R1 K  p 1 (a; )
L K K E[ (xt+1) jxt = ]
Ha K K E[ (xt+1) jxt = ; at = a]
Ha K K E[ (xt+1) jxt = ; at = a]  E[ (xt+1) jxt = ; at = 0]
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Table A. The matrices consist of (di¤erences in) expected payo¤s and probabilities. The latter
represent conditional expectations for any function  of xt+1.
Vector Representing
 E ["t (at)jxt = ]
Ra0 0 (a; )
R0 E [0 (at; xt) jxt = ]
Ha (IK   L) 1 R0
P1
t=0 
t (E [0 (at; xt) ja0 = a; x0 = x]  E [0 (at; xt) ja0 = 0; x0 = x])
Ha (IK   L) 1 R1
P1
t=0 
t (E [1 (at; xt) ja0 = a; x0 = x]  E [1 (at; xt) ja0 = 0; x0 = x])
Ha (IK   L) 1 
P1
t=0 
t (E ["t (at) ja0 = a; x0 = x]  E ["t (at) ja0 = 0; x0 = x])
Table B. The K  1 vectors represent (di¤erences in) expected payo¤s.
Proof: This is a special case of Lemma R in Sanches et al. (2016).
All vectors and matrices in Tables A and B are either known or estimable from the choice and
transitional probabilities. The tables will serve as a useful reference for constructing the necessary
components we use for dening the criterion function in Section 3.3.
Given that we can identify va (0; 0) for all a > 0, to identify (0; 0), it is su¢ cient to show
that for all (; ) 6= (0; 0), va (; ) 6= va (0; 0) for some a. Our next lemma provides a
characterization as to how changing  and  can a¤ect va.
Lemma 2: Under Assumptions M and P, for any a > 0 and (; ) ; (0; 0) 2 B :
va (; ) va (; 0) =  Ra1 + Ha (IK   L) 1 R1 (   0) ; (6)
va (0; 0) va (; 0) = (   0) Ha (IK   0L) 1 (IK   L) 1 (R0 + R10 + ) : (7)
And (; ) is identiable if and only if there is no other (0; 0) such that for all a > 0:
va (0; 0) va (; 0) = va (; ) va (; 0) :
Proof: Follows from some algebra based on equation (5).
Lemma 2 illustrates the nature of the identication problem we have at hand. We highlight the
following particulars:
(i) If the discount rate is assumed to be known, from (6), a su¢ cient condition for va (0; ) 6=
va (0; 
0) when  6= 0 is that Ra1 + Ha (IK   L) 1 R1 has full column rank for some a > 0.
Also see Theorem 3 in Srisuma (2015).
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(ii) If the payo¤ function is assumed to be known, from (7), a su¢ cient condition forva (0; 0) 6=
va (; 0) when  6= 0 is that (R0 + R10 + ) 6= 0 and Ha is invertible some a > 0.
(iii) Suppose p is large relative to K. Then for any a > 0 such that Ra1 +H
a (IK   L) 1 R1
has rank K, and for any 0;  6= 0 that va (0; 0) 6= va (; 0), by equating (6) and (7), we can
always nd  such that va (0; 0) = va (; ).
Point (i) shows that su¢ cient conditions for identication of the payo¤ parameters when the
discount rate is assumed known can be easily stated and veried. More generally the su¢ cient
condition for the identication of the payo¤parameter can be stated in terms of the full column rank
of the matrix that stacks together Ra1 + H
a (IK   L) 1 R1 over a. In the case we are able to
identify the payo¤ function outside of the dynamic model, (ii) shows that the discount factor can
also be identied and provide one type of su¢ cient conditions that can be readily checked. Point (iii)
shares the intuition along the line of Manski (1993) that when the parameterization on the payo¤
function is too rich, (; ) may not identiable in B .
From Lemma 2, it is also apparent that we should be able to identify (0; 0) jointly when the
change in the vector of expected payo¤s from altering the discount factor moves in a di¤erent direction
to the change caused by altering the payo¤ parameters.
3.3 Sum of Squares Criterion Function
The study of identication involving the discount factor is complicated due to the fact that V; is
nonlinear in (; ). However, for a given , we can see from (5) that V; is linear in . We use
proling to exploit the conditional linearity to simplify the identication problem for a nonlinear
model with p+ 1 parameters to a one-dimensional problem.
Let ma (; )  va (0; 0) va (; ). Then we can write, using (5):
ma (; ) = aa () Ba () ;
aa ()  va (0; 0) Ra0   Ha (IK   L) 1 (R0 + ) ;
Ba ()  Ra1 + Ha (IK   L) 1 R1:
It is clear that ma (; ) is linear in  for any given . We can stack together the system of equations
above across a. In doing so we obtain the following vector value function, m : B ! RKJ :
m (; ) = a () B () ; (8)
where a () is a KJ  1 vector and B () is a KJ  p matrix.
LetM (; )  km (; )k, i.e. M (; ) is the Euclidean norm ofm (; ). Then by construction,
M (; ) = 0 if (; ) = (0; 0) ;
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and any other (; ) such thatM (; ) = 0 is observationally equivalent to (0; 0) by the property
of the norm. ThereforeM has the necessary property to serve as a criterion for identication.
Next we prole out  in order to reduce the dimensionality onM by exploiting its least squares
structure. For each , run a regression of a () on B (), we can dene:
 ()  (B ()>B ())yB ()> a () : (9)
So that  () is a least squares solution to min2M (; ). Then we dene:
M () M (;  ()) : (10)
By construction it also holds that
M () = 0 if  = 0:
In this way we have reduced the parameter space in the identication problem to a one-dimensional
one. Furthermore the domain of the parameter space is on a small interval: [0; 1). The reasoning is
analogous to proling in an estimation routine. Particularly we can ignore any  that does not lie in
arg min2M (; ) since necessarily,
M (; ) >M (;  ())  0:
Therefore (0; 0) is identied when M () has a unique minimum and min2M (0; ) has a
unique solution.
Theorem 1: Under Assumptions M and P, (0; 0) is identiable in fV;g(;)2B if
M () = 0 if and only if  = 0;
and B (0) has full column rank.
Proof: Suppose (0; 0) is identiable. If there is 
0 6= 0 such that M (0) = 0, then
va (0; 0) = v
a (0;  (0)) for all a by the property of the norm. Since  is a closed set,
by the projection theorem,  (0) exists and is the unique element in . This leads to a contradic-
tion since (0; 0) and (
0;  (0)) are observationally equivalent. Next, suppose that B (0) does
not have full column rank. Let 0 be another element in arg min2M (0; ) that di¤ers from 0.
SinceM (0; )  0 for all  2  andM (0; 0) = 0,M (0; 0) = 0. Thus (0; 0) and (0; 0) are
observationally equivalent, also a contradiction.
Comments on Theorem 1:
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(i) High Level Assumptions. Conditions in Theorem 1 are high level as we do not relate them
to the underlying primitives of the model. However, they are statements made on objects that
are observed or can be consistently estimated nonparametrically. In the Appendix we give a more
detailed conditions forM to have a unique minimum; see Theorem 4.
(ii) Feasible Check and Estimation. Since we have reduced the identication problem to a single-
parameter that can reside only in a narrow range, there is no need to refer to complicated results
for the identication of a general nonlinear model. We can use the sample parts of components in
Tables A and B to consistently estimateM () for all . So one can plot the sample counterpart
of M over B for an exhaustive analysis of the problem. Once the minimum of M is found, the
corresponding rank matrix can then be checked. This suggests one natural way to estimate the
discount factor, namely by grid search. In practice we can detect an identication problem if the
sample counterpart ofM contains a at region at the minimum, or when the sample counterpart
of B (0) does not have full column rank.
(iii) Identication in the empirical model. It is clear that positive identication of (0; 0) in
our empirical model is su¢ cient for identifying (0; 0) in the full-solution model. Therefore our
identication results in this paper can be used to establish identication in the full-solution model.
However, we the implication may not be necessary, and we do not make any other claim on the
identication of the full-solution model. The identication study in the full-solution model is much
more complicated since it is less tractable analytically; for a further discussion we refer the reader to
Srisuma (2015).
By inspecting the proof of Theorem 1 it is clear there are some separation between the identi-
ability of 0 and 0. In particular we have dened 
 () using a generalized inverse of the matrix
B ()>B (). Therefore 0 can be identied even if 0 is not.
The full column rank condition on B (0), however, is not an innocuous assumption when we view
Assumption P as a representation of a nonparametric function. In practice this is often delivered by
exclusion assumptions or more generally by normalization of payo¤ parameters. Next section we will
focus on payo¤ parameters that we call switching costs. We will revisit the question of identiability
of the discount factor under di¤erent normalization choice in Section 4.3.
4 Nonparametric Identication of Switching Costs
In this section we consider payo¤ functions under nonparametric restrictions that allow us to obtain
closed-form expressions for the switching costs parameters. In Section 4.1 we dene a switching cost
function and explain the assumptions required for our identication result. Section 4.2 gives the
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identication result. Section 4.3 relates the identication of the discount factor under Assumption P
to models with switching costs.
4.1 Switching Costs
The payo¤function cannot be nonparametrically identied without any restrictions. Economic theory
can help guide how to impose structures on the payo¤ function. A main consideration in making
a dynamic discrete decision is how a change in ones action from the previous period immediately
a¤ect todays payo¤s. Actions from the past are therefore often important components of the state
variables. We will consider restrictions focusing on switching costs.
In order to highlight the role of switching costs we distinguish past actions from other state
variables. At time t we denote actions from the previous period by wt, so that wt  at 1. We denote
the switching cost from changing action from w to a by SCw!a. Subsequently, in this section we
shall maintain an updated version of Assumption M where xt is replaced with (wt; xt) everywhere.
In addition we impose the following assumptions.
Assumption N
(i) (Decomposition of Prots): For all a; w; x:
 (a; w; x) =  (a; x) +  (a  w;w; x) ;
such that  (0; w; x) = 0.
(ii) (Conditional Independence): The distribution of xt+1 conditional on at and xt is independent
of wt.
The decomposition of  in N(i) may appear peculiar at rst, but it is typical in many empirical IO
applications. We will give an interpretation of its components within the context of an IO application.
The dening feature of  is that it excludes past actions.  can represent the rms operational prot
in the current period, such as variable prots and operational costs, which does not depend on actions
from the past.  is the switching cost function that takes non-zero values only when a change of
action occurs. Note that, by construction, we have:
 (a  w;w; x) = SCw!a (x)  1 [w 6= a] ; (11)
where 1 [] denotes the indicator function.
Assumption N(ii) imposes that knowing actions from the past does not help predict future state
variables when the present action and other observable state variables are known. Note that N(ii) is
not implied by M(ii). In many applications fxtg is simply assumed to be a strictly exogenous rst
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order Markov process. Specically this implies xt+1 is independent of at conditional on xt in addition
to N(ii). In any case, unlike M(ii), N(ii) is a restriction made on the observables so it can be tested
directly from the data. Later on we shall show how xt can be modied to contain past actions so
N(ii) can be weakened to allow for dependence of other state variables with past actions.
Even under Assumption N(i) identication issue persists (e.g. see the discussion in Aguirregabiria
and Suzuki (2014)). SCw!a cannot be identied for all w 6= a without any further restrictions. Some
of their di¤erences, however, can be identied. For example, identication is possible if we normalize
some baseline switching costs to be known. We will look at di¤erent restrictions that can be used
to identify individual or combination of the switching costs. Before giving the formal result we
provide an intuition as to why Assumption N is helpful for identifying the switching costs. It will
also illustrate the key steps of our identication strategy.
Exclusion and Independence Restrictions
Consider a two-period entry/exit decision problem. Let A = f0; 1g, where 0 denotes exit and
1 denotes entry. Then SC0!1 and SC1!0 respectively have interpretations of entry cost and scrap
value. In this case we can write
 (a  w;w; x) = SC0!1 (x)  a (1  w) + SC1!0 (x)  (1  a)w: (12)
The choice-specic value function (cf. (3)) in this model is:
 (a; w; x) =  (a; w; x) + E [ (at+1; wt+1; xt+1) jat = a; wt = w; xt = x] :
Let  (w; x)   (1; w; x)    (0; w; x). At time t, a rm will enter if and only if  (w; x) >
"t (0)  "t (1). We can identify  from the observed choice probabilities.
The role of our assumptions is to isolate todays switching costs from the remaining components
in the choice-specic value function. Specically, we apply N(i) to decompose the prot function in
the current period and use N(ii) to simplify the expected future prots. We can then re-write the
equation above as
 (a; w; x) =  (a; x) +  (a  w;w; x) ; where
 (a; x) =  (a; x) + E [ (at+1; a; xt+1) jat = a; xt = x] :
Crucially note that the conditional expectation on future prots in  no longer depends on wt under
N(ii) due to the law of iterated expectation. We treat  as a nuisance parameter. It is a nonparametric
object that depends on all primitives in the model. Let  (x)   (1; x)   (0; x). Using equation
(12) we have,
 (w; x) =  (x) + SC0!1 (x)  (1  w)  SC1!0 (x)  w: (13)
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It is now clear we can identify a combination of the switching costs by di¤erencing out  in the
equation above:
 (1; x)  (0; x) =  SC0!1 (x)  SC1!0 (x) : (14)
In an entry/exit game the quantity  SC0!1   SC1!0 represents the sunk entry cost that a rm
cannot recover back once it decides to leave the market after entering. Equation (14) shows the sunk
entry cost can be identied independently of  and . On the other hand, it is well known that entry
cost and scrap value cannot be nonparametrically identied separately in this particular model. In
an empirical work an unidentied object gets normalized. It is clear from equation (14) that either
the entry cost or scrap value can be identied if one of them is assumed to be known. For example,
a common assumption is to normalize the scrap value to be zero, the entry cost can be estimated
conditionally on this value along with the other parameters.
The identication strategy above can be generalized substantially. Results for a more general
single agent decision model under M and N can be obtained with little modication. But extending
our single agents results to dynamic games is more complex. It requires additional notations and
a more general notion of a di¤erence, characterized by a projection matrix, is used. We defer the
details for dynamic games to the Appendix.
4.2 Closed-Form Identication
We start by providing an expression for the di¤erences in choice-specic valuations that generalizes
equation (13). For any a > 0, let v (a; w; x)  v (a; w; x) v (0; w; x),  (a; x)   (a; x)  (0; x),
and  (a; w; x)   (a  w;w; x)   ( w;w; x). Lemma 3 generalizes equation (13).
Lemma 3: Under Assumptions M and N, we have for all i; a > 0 and w; x:
v (a; w; x) =  (a; x) +  (a; w; x) ; (15)
where
 (a; x)   (a; x)   (0; x) +  (em (a; x)  em (0; x)) ;em (a; x)  E [m (a; xt+1) jat = a; xt = x] ;
m (w; x)  E [V (st) jwt = w; xt = x] :
Proof: Using the law of iterated expectation, the value function as dened in equation (2) satis-
es: E [V (st+1) jat; wt; xt] = E [m (wt+1; xt+1) jat; wt; xt] under M(ii). E [m (wt+1; xt+1) jat; wt; xt] can
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be simplied further to E [em (at; xt) jat; xt] after another application of the law of iterated expecta-
tion and imposing N(ii). The remainder of the proof then follows from the denitions of the terms
dened within the main text.
The components of v consist of  and . We treat  as a nuisance parameter.  contains
the switching costs of interest, for any a; w; x:
 (a; w; x) = SCw!a (x)  1 [w 6= a]  SCw!0 (x)  1 [w 6= 0] : (16)
As seen previously we can identify the di¤erences in  by eliminating . This can be done by
looking at the di¤erences of v (a; w; x) across di¤erent w while holding (a; x) xed.
Theorem 2: Under Assumptions M and N, we have for all a > 0 and x;w;w0:
 (a; w; x)  (a; w0; x) = v (a; w; x) v (a; w0; x) : (17)
Theorem 2 follows immediately from Lemma 3. Equation (17) tells us that we can always identify
some combinations of the switching costs nonparametrically. Importantly the identied objects do
not depend on  or .
Comments on Theorem 2.
(i) Certain di¤erences in  in equation (17) are economically meaningful. We have already
introduced the sunk entry cost in the entry/exit model as an example. The notion of sunk costs
naturally generalizes to other irreversible investment costs with a varying degree of commitment.
More specically consider an investment or capacity game where it costs a rm to choose at > at 1
and, conversely, a rm can divest to recover some of these costs by choosing at < at 1. In this
case  SCa0!a   SCa!a0 with a > a0 represents a sunk investment cost for a rm that increases its
investment level from a0 to a then divests back to a0. Using equations (16) and (17), Corollaries 1
and 2 give closed-form expressions for identifying the sunk investment costs.
Corollary 1. For all a > 0; x:
 SC0!a (x)  SCa!0 (x) = v (a; a; x) v (a; 0; x) :
Corollary 2. For all a; a0 > 0; x:
 SCa0!a (x)  SCa!a0 (x) = v (a; a; x) + v (a0; a0; x) v (a; a0; x) v (a0; a; x) :
(ii) We would prefer to identify the switching costs individually. However, without further in-
formation, they are not identied nonparametrically for this type of models; for example see Aguir-
regabiria and Suzuki (2014) for a thorough discussion. But identication can be achieved if we are
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willing to impose some constraints on the switching costs. One example is by assuming symmetry of
switching costs between any two actions, which would be reasonable in applications with logistical
or physical adjustment costs such as the traditional menu costs (e.g. see Slade (1998)). Corollary 3
shows that individual switching costs under symmetry are identied. Its proof follows immediately
from Corollaries 1 and 2.
Corollary 3. For all a; a0; x, suppose that SCa
0!a (x) = SCa!a
0
(x), then for any a; a0 > 0:
SC0!a (x) =   (v (a; a; x) v (a; 0; x)) =2;
SCa!a
0
(x) =  (v (a; a; x) + v (a0; a0; x) v (a; a0; x) v (a0; a; x))=2:
(iii) It is frequent in many applications that some components of the switching costs are taken
to be known. Typically this is done by way of a normalization assumption. The most commonly
used normalization assumes that taking action 0 yields zero payo¤. For example, for an entry or
investment game with entry, such assumption means a rm has no recovery value of assets upon
leaving the market. In other cases some institutional or other external knowledge outside of the
dynamic model are used. For example, Kalouptsidi (2014) uses data on resale value of second hand
ships to identify the scrap values and entry costs directly. In another example, in a study of promotion
pricing decisions, My´sliwski, Sanches, Silva and Srisuma (2017) rely on anecdotal evidence to assume
a cost is incurred to producers when a sale promotion is on while there is no costs for switching back
to the regular price. In these cases we can identify individual switching costs directly as Corollary 4
shows.
Corollary 4. For all a0, suppose SCa
0!0 (x) = 0 (w; x) then for any a; a
0; x:
SCa
0!a (x) = v (a; a0; x) v (a; a; x) + 0 (a0; x)  0 (a; x) : (18)
It is important to highlight that assigning incorrect values to 0 generally leads to incorrect values
of SCw!a. On the other hand, it is easy to verify that certain combinations of switching costs,
including those in Corollaries 1 and 2, are robust against any choice of 0.
(iv) Generally Corollaries 1 and 2 can be informative on the validity of a particular normalization
choice since they have been derived without any normalization. For example, let us go back to
the discussion on investment game at the end of our rst comment where there is a divestment
opportunity. In this context it would be natural to assume that  SCa0!a   SCa!a0 = c0 for some
positive c0 when a > a0. Then, given both  SCa0!a and SCa!a0 are positive, it must be the case
that  SCa0!a is bounded below by c0.
(v) When A = f0; 1g our Theorem 1 implies the sunk entry cost can be identied without any
normalization. Proposition 2 in Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014) has established the same result
using a di¤erent argument.
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The results of Theorem 2 and Corollaries 1 to 4 are constructive. We can replace the unknown v
using the empirical choice probabilities. The sample analog estimators can be computed without any
optimization. Given the empirical literature is concerned with the computational cost our closed-
form identication result can substantially reduce the number of parameters to be estimated in a
model. Such estimators will be consistent and asymptotically normal as long as the initial choice
probabilities have these properties.
4.3 Identication and Normalization
We have emphasized that normalizations of switching costs are necessary in many situations. The
validity of the identication of payo¤parameters is not robust against incorrect normalization choice.
We now ask: to what extent the identication of the discount factor depends on the specic normal-
ization choice on the payo¤ parameters?
In the empirical literature the discount factor is customarily assumed to be known while the focus
on identication falls on which payo¤ parameters can (or cannot) be identied. A particular nor-
malization choice is made, for example, by assigning a value to an unknown parameter as previously
explained. Such normalization assumption is always made independent to the choice of the discount
factor. The identication problem on the payo¤ parameters considered in practice therefore mathe-
matically translates to the matrix B () in equation (8) being rank decient for all . In particular
it is also implicitly assumed that the linear dependence relation between the column vectors of B ()
are the same for all .
Recall that B () is a KJ  p matrix. For the remainder of this subsection we shall assume
 (B ()) = r < p for all , such that:
B () = [B1 () : B2 ()] ;
where B1 () is a matrix consisting of the rst r columns of B () with CS (B1 ()) = CS (B ()),
and B2 () is a matrix containing the last (p  r) columns of B (). It will now be convenient to
re-introduce hereM (; ) = ka () B () k from Section 3.3, along with equations (9) and (10)
respectively:
 ()  (B ()>B ())yB ()> a () ;
M ()  M (;  ()) :
When we present our Theorem 1, we stated that (0; 0) is identied when M () has a unique
minimum and min2M (0; ) has a unique solution. The issue associated with normalizing payo¤
parameters only concerns the latter, as we knowM (0; ) has a unique minimum at 0 if and only
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if B () has full column rank. Since B () is rank decient, M (0; ) has a linear subspace of
minimizers. Normalization is a way to select an element from this subspace. This is a separate issue
to whetherM () has a unique minimum or not. One way to clearly illustrate this is the following.
Since CS (B2 ())  CS (B1 ()), there exists an r  (p  r) matrix   such that B2 () =
B1 ()  .5 Making a normalization on the payo¤ parameters corresponds to xing a value of 2. For
any (; 2) we can dene 

1 (; 2) to be the minimizer of ka () B1 () 1  B1 ()  2k, so that:
1 (; 2) = (B1 ()
>B1 ()) 1B1 ()
> a ()   2:
We can then prole out 1, and dene:
M (; 2)  ka () B1 () 1 (; 2) B1 ()   () 2k :
Substituting 1 (; 2) into the right hand side of the display above, we get
M (; 2) 
a () B1 () (B1 ()>B1 ()) 1B1 ()> a () :
We see thatM (; 2) is simply the norm of the residual one gets from an orthogonal projection of
a () onto CS (B1 ()). Importantly,M (; 2) does not depend on 2. From the projection theory
in linear algebra, M () and M (; 2) are necessarily equal. This residual will also be identical
if we project a () on the linear span of any other r linear combinations of the columns in B ()
as long as it equals CS (B ()). Therefore our argument holds without any loss of generality on
how we select B1 (). In practice, a researcher has to perform this selection when she decides upon
her normalization choice. Subsequently, the discount factor can be identied regardless of how we
normalize the payo¤ parameters. We state this result as a proposition.
Proposition 1: If the discount factor can be identied, it can be identied for all normalization
choices on the payo¤ parameters.
Our discussion here also leads to another empirical fact that may not be obvious a priori. Sup-
pose a researcher species a payo¤ function in practice that satises both P and N. Then there
are two di¤erent ways to estimate the switching costs based on our parametric and nonparametric
identication approaches. We have shown in Section 4 that some combinations of the switching costs
can be identied without any normalization using the nonparametric approach. We are interested
to know whether the parametric approach taken in Section 3, which relies on a possibly incorrect
normalization choice, can consistently estimate these combinations.
The answer is positive. Consider any combination of the switching costs, which can be written
explicitly in terms of the di¤erences in choice-specic valuations (e.g. sunk costs, and more generally
5For instance, this is a consequence of Theorem 6.2.4 in Mirsky (1955).
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Corollaries 1 and 2). A vector of such combinations can be represented by a0 for some matrix
. Then for any e such that (0;e) is observationally equivalent to (0; 0) we also have a0 =
B (0) 0 = B (0)e. I.e. the combinations of switching costs described by B (0) identify the
same objects.
5 Numerical Illustration
We now illustrate the use of our identication strategies and implement the suggested estimators in
the previous sections. Section 5.1 gives results from a Monte Carlo study taken from Pesendorfer
and Schmidt-Dengler (2008). Section 5.2 estimates a discrete investment game using the data from
Ryan (2012).
5.1 Monte Carlo Study
The simulation design is the two-rm dynamic entry game taken from Section 7 in Pesendorfer and
Schmidt-Dengler (2008). In period t each rm i has two possible choices, ait 2 f0; 1g; with ait = 1
denoting entry. The only observed state variables are previous periods actions, wt = (a1t 1; a2t 1).
Using their notation, rm 10s period payo¤s are described as follows:
1 (a1t; a2t; xt; ) = a1t (1 + 2a2t) + a1t (1  a1t 1)F + (1  a1t) a1t 1W; (19)
where 1; 2; F and W are respectively the monopoly prot, duopoly prot, entry cost and scrap
value. The latter two components are switching costs. Each rm also receives additive private shocks
that are i.i.d. N (0; 1). The game is symmetric and Firms 2 payo¤s are dened analogously. The data
generating parameters are set as: (10; 20; F0;W0) = (1:2; 1:2; 0:2; 0:1) and 0 = 0:9. Pesendorfer
and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) show there are three distinct equilibria for this game.
It is easy to verify the model satises both Assumptions MN and MP in the Appendix, which are
the dynamic games generalization of Assumptions N and P. Therefore we can estimate the model in
at least two di¤erent ways. We consider the following two estimation methods. Method A proles
out all the payo¤ parameters using the OLS expression and use grid search to estimate the discount
factor. Method B rst estimates the entry cost in closed-form independently before proling out
the other payo¤ parameters and use grid search to estimate the discount factor. We will also be
interested to see how sensitive our estimates are with respect to the normalization choice.
For each equilibrium we perform 10000 simulations with sample sizes N = 100; 1000; 10000. Since
the entry cost and scrap value cannot be jointly identied we estimate the model under di¤erent
normalized values for W . We report the bias and standard deviation (in italics) for (b; b1; b2; bF )
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and the sunk entry cost ( \SUNK). We use the bold font to highlight the statistics that correspond
to the correctly assumed choice of W . We estimate the sunk entry cost for Methods A and B by rst
estimating the entry cost and combine it with the assumed scrap value. In addition we also estimate
the sunk entry cost without normalizing the scrap value according to Example 1 in the Appendix (also
see Corollary 1). We label the columns of statistics for the sunk entry estimator with no normalization
by N-N. Tables 1-3 below provides results that correspond to the data generated according to the
three equilibria as enumerated in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) respectively.
The ndings are in line with the theory part of the paper. First it shows the discount factor can
be consistently estimated. The consistency property is robust against the normalization choice of the
scrap value. The sunk entry cost can also be consistently estimated independently of the scrap value
used. When the model is correctly specied in the sense we correctly assume W = W0 all estimators
are consistent. While misspecifying the scrap value cause biases to all estimators of the individual
payo¤ parameters. The estimation results from Methods A and B, as well as N-N for the sunk entry,
are qualitatively the same across all equilibria. The performances between estimation methods
seem to depend on the equilibrium and sample size. Method A performs better in Equilibrium 1,
and generally in smaller samples. We may be able to attribute the di¤erence in smaller samples
performance to the fact that Method A fully exploits the correctly specied parametric form of the
payo¤ function while the others use nonparametric estimators. At larger sample sizes there appear
to be no dominating estimation methods for Equilibria 2 and 3.
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Method A Method B N-N
N W 0 0:1 0:2 0 0:1 0:2 -
100 b -0.0809 -0.0806 -0.0799 -0.0752 -0.0768 -0.0738 -
0.2697 0.2691 0.2686 0.2619 0.2640 0.2596b1 -0.0418 -0.0253 -0.0071 -0.0631 -0.0450 -0.0291 -
0.2974 0.3050 0.3150 0.3693 0.3774 0.3858b2 0.0627 0.0815 0.0988 0.0963 0.1141 0.1313 -
0.2970 0.2991 0.3029 0.4779 0.4801 0.4831bF 0.0446 -0.0554 -0.1552 -0.0019 -0.1017 -0.2021 -
0.2836 0.2835 0.2839 0.5692 0.5699 0.5702
\SUNK 0.0554 0.0554 0.0552 0.1019 0.1017 0.1021 0.0477
0.2836 0.2835 0.2839 0.5692 0.5699 0.5702 0.5935
1000 b -0.0356 -0.0372 -0.0380 -0.0328 -0.0339 -0.0343 -
0.1741 0.1790 0.1801 0.1677 0.1695 0.1715b1 -0.0051 0.0090 0.0229 -0.0028 0.0110 0.0244 -
0.1032 0.1129 0.1251 0.1066 0.1152 0.1265b2 -0.0046 0.0091 0.0231 -0.0084 0.0050 0.0185 -
0.0934 0.0946 0.0992 0.1190 0.1204 0.1246bF 0.0958 -0.0042 -0.1042 0.1000 0.0000 -0.1000 -
0.0901 0.0901 0.0902 0.1480 0.1480 0.1480
\SUNK 0.0042 0.0042 0.0042 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0132
0.0901 0.0901 0.0902 0.1480 0.1480 0.1480 0.1573
10000 b -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0005 -
0.0204 0.0158 0.0204 0.0204 0.0238 0.0205b1 -0.0104 -0.0004 0.0097 -0.0101 0.0000 0.0100 -
0.0298 0.0299 0.0309 0.0302 0.0310 0.0312b2 -0.0093 0.0007 0.0108 -0.0098 0.0003 0.0103 -
0.0297 0.0298 0.0300 0.0355 0.0356 0.0358bF 0.0992 -0.0008 -0.1008 0.0998 -0.0002 -0.1002 -
0.0282 0.0282 0.0282 0.0437 0.0437 0.0437
\SUNK 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0011
0.0282 0.0282 0.0282 0.0437 0.0437 0.0437 0.0454
Table 1: Data generated from equilibrium 1 in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008).
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Method A Method B N-N
N W 0 0:1 0:2 0 0:1 0:2 -
100 b -0.0675 -0.0691 -0.0704 -0.0667 -0.0660 -0.0684 -
0.2501 0.2523 0.2542 0.2493 0.2477 0.2513b1 -0.2087 -0.1899 -0.1726 -0.1185 -0.1027 -0.0835 -
0.3978 0.4135 0.4286 0.4495 0.4572 0.4718b2 0.3264 0.3447 0.3623 0.1847 0.2025 0.2196 -
0.5430 0.5454 0.5500 0.6563 0.6605 0.6641bF -0.0630 -0.1632 -0.2632 0.0942 -0.0058 -0.1058 -
0.4166 0.4161 0.4159 0.5515 0.5515 0.5515
\SUNK 0.1630 0.1632 0.1632 0.0058 0.0058 0.0058 -0.0455
0.4166 0.4161 0.4159 0.5515 0.5515 0.5515 0.5991
1000 b -0.0296 -0.0302 -0.0314 -0.0318 -0.0306 -0.0304 -
0.1584 0.1600 0.1625 0.1637 0.1603 0.1594b1 -0.0275 -0.0139 0.0003 -0.0096 0.0028 0.0158 -
0.1631 0.1739 0.1872 0.1596 0.1691 0.1807b2 0.0494 0.0626 0.0763 0.0267 0.0394 0.0523 -
0.2108 0.2159 0.2234 0.2047 0.2097 0.2162bF 0.0767 -0.0233 -0.1233 0.1006 0.0006 -0.0994 -
0.1526 0.1526 0.1526 0.1495 0.1495 0.1495
\SUNK 0.0233 0.0233 0.0233 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0052
0.1526 0.1526 0.1526 0.1495 0.1495 0.1495 0.1638
10000 b -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002 -
0.0093 0.0127 0.0183 0.0130 0.0183 0.0128b1 -0.0147 -0.0046 0.0056 -0.0127 -0.0025 0.0073 -
0.0399 0.0405 0.0425 0.0381 0.0398 0.0387b2 -0.0036 0.0064 0.0166 -0.0063 0.0039 0.0138 -
0.0639 0.0642 0.0649 0.0608 0.0613 0.0610bF 0.0968 -0.0032 -0.1032 0.0995 -0.0005 -0.1005 -
0.0487 0.0487 0.0487 0.0464 0.0464 0.0464
\SUNK 0.0032 0.0032 0.0032 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0002
0.0487 0.0487 0.0487 0.0464 0.0464 0.0464 0.0508
Table 2: Data generated from equilibrium 2 in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008).
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Method A Method B N-N
N W 0 0:1 0:2 0 0:1 0:2 -
100 b -0.0649 -0.0641 -0.0658 -0.0695 -0.0649 -0.0663 -
0.2459 0.2427 0.2472 0.2526 0.2450 0.2471b1 -0.2070 -0.1907 -0.1725 -0.1116 -0.0986 -0.0807 -
0.3991 0.4108 0.4261 0.4724 0.4804 0.4920b2 0.3263 0.3420 0.3588 0.1801 0.1961 0.2130 -
0.5460 0.5484 0.5551 0.7092 0.7109 0.7158bF -0.0677 -0.1676 -0.2672 0.0897 -0.0103 -0.1103 -
0.4224 0.4227 0.4230 0.5987 0.5988 0.5988
\SUNK 0.1677 0.1676 0.1672 0.0103 0.0103 0.0103 -0.0370
0.4224 0.4227 0.4230 0.5987 0.5988 0.5988 0.6455
1000 b -0.0320 -0.0322 -0.0333 -0.0326 -0.0324 -0.0319 -
0.1634 0.1643 0.1666 0.1647 0.1648 0.1638b1 -0.0237 -0.0104 0.0041 -0.0060 0.0071 0.0199 -
0.1677 0.1796 0.1932 0.1678 0.1790 0.1900b2 0.0500 0.0633 0.0771 0.0251 0.0383 0.0511 -
0.2130 0.2188 0.2264 0.2174 0.2235 0.2305bF 0.0766 -0.0234 -0.1234 0.1014 0.0014 -0.0986 -
0.1549 0.1550 0.1550 0.1604 0.1604 0.1604
\SUNK 0.0234 0.0234 0.0234 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0061
0.1549 0.1550 0.1550 0.1604 0.1604 0.1604 0.1785
10000 b -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0002 -
0.0159 0.0158 0.0156 0.0093 0.0163 0.0128b1 -0.0146 -0.0046 0.0054 -0.0128 -0.0026 0.0073 -
0.0410 0.0414 0.0420 0.0399 0.0415 0.0410b2 -0.0033 0.0067 0.0167 -0.0062 0.0039 0.0138 -
0.0648 0.0649 0.0650 0.0646 0.0650 0.0650bF 0.0965 -0.0035 -0.1035 0.0992 -0.0008 -0.1008 -
0.0496 0.0496 0.0496 0.0497 0.0497 0.0497
\SUNK 0.0035 0.0035 0.0035 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0002
0.0496 0.0496 0.0496 0.0497 0.0497 0.0497 0.0553
Table 3: Data generated from equilibrium 3 in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008).
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5.2 Empirical Illustration
We next estimate a simplied version of an entry-investment game based on the model studied in
Ryan (2012); using the same dataset as him. In what follows we provide a brief description of the
data, highlight the main di¤erences between our empirical model and that of Ryan (2012). Then we
present and discuss our estimates of the model primitives.
Data
We download Ryans data from the Econometrica webpage.6 There are two sets of data. One
contains aggregate prices and quantities for all the US regional markets from the US Geological
Surveys Mineral Yearbook. The other contains the capacities of plants and plant-level information
that Ryan has collected for the Portland cement industry in the United States from 1980 to 1998.
Data on plants includes the name of the rm that owns the plant, the location of the plant, the
number of kilns in the plant and kiln characteristics. Following Ryan we assume that the plant
capacity equals the sum of the capacity of all kilns in the plant and that di¤erent plants are owned
by di¤erent rms. We observe that plantsnames and ownerships change frequently. This can be
due to either mergers and acquisitions or to simple changes in the company name. We do not treat
these changes as entry/exit movements. We check each observation in the sample using the kiln
information (fuel type, process type, year of installation and plant location) installed in the plant. If
a plant changes its name but keeps the same kiln characteristics, we assume that the name change
is not associated to any entry/exit movement. This way of preparing the data enables us to match
most of the summary statistics of plant-level data in Table 2 of Ryan. Any discrepancies most likely
can be attributed to the way we treat the change in plantsnames, which may di¤er to Ryan in a
very small number of cases.
Dynamic Game
Ryan models a dynamic game played between rms that own cement plants in order to measure
the welfare costs of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (1990 CAAA) on the US Portland cement
industry. The decision for each rm is rst whether to enter (or remain in) the market or exit, and if
it is active in the market then how much to invest or divest. Firms investment decisions is governed
by its capacity level. The rms prot is determined by variable payo¤s from the competition in the
product market with other rms, as well as switching costs from the entry and investment/divestment
decisions. There are two action variables in Ryans model. One is a binary choice used to model
6https://www.econometricsociety.org/content/supplement-costs-environmental-regulation-concentrated-industry-
0.
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entry. The other is a continuous variable used to model the level of investment. Past actions are the
only observed endogenous state variables in the game. The aggregate data that are used to construct
variable prots, through a static Cournot game with capacity constraints between rms, are treated
as exogenous.
We consider a discrete game that extends the single agent model in the paper as described in
the Appendix. The main departure from Ryan (2012) is that we combine the entry decision along
with the capacity level into a single discrete variable. We set the action space to be an ordinal
set f0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5g, where 0 represents exit/inactive, and the positive integers are ordered to denote
entry/active with di¤erent capacity levels. The payo¤ for each rm has two additive separable
components. One depends on the observables while the other is an unobserved shock. The observable
component can be broken down into variable prots, operating cost and switching costs. We assume
the variable prot is determined by the players competing in a capacity constrained Cournot game.
The operating cost is a xed prot that incurs whenever ait > 0. The switching costs capture the
essence of rmsentry and investment decisions. Lastly each rm receives unobserved prot shocks
for each action with a standard i.i.d. type-1 extreme value distribution.
Estimation
The period expected payo¤ for each rm as a function of the observables consists of variable
prots, operating costs and switching costs. The variable prot is derived from a capacity constrained
Cournot game constructed from the same demand and cost functions estimated as in Ryans paper.
The operating and switching costs parameters enter the payo¤ function additively and are parameters
to be estimated using the dynamic model. These operating cost is non-zero whenever ait > 0. For
the switching costs we normalize the payo¤ for choosing action 0 to be zero. There are a total of 25
switching cost parameters to be estimated.7
The payo¤ function used in our empirical model satises Assumptions MN and MP in the Ap-
pendix. So we estimate the model using Methods A and B as described in Section 5.1. We also test
if the two estimates of the switching costs statistically di¤er. Instead of using nonparametric estima-
tor, similar to Ryan, we use a multinomial logit to estimate the choice and transition probabilities
in the rst stage. More specically, method A proles out the 26 linear coe¢ cients and uses grid
search to estimate the discount factor. Method B rst estimates the 25 switching cost parameters
in closed-form using the closed-form expression in Section 4, treat them as known, before proling
and performing the grid search. We also estimate the sunk entry and investment values based on the
7Ryan (2012) models the switching costs di¤erently. The xed operating cost is normalized to be zero. Non-zero
investment and divestment costs are drawn from two distinct independent normal distributions, whose means and
variances are estimated using the methodology described in Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007).
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estimates from Methods A and B, as well as nonparametrically without normalization (cf. Corollaries
1 and 2, and see the discussion in the Appendix).
We estimate the standard errors, as well as computing the p-value of the Wald statistics to test
if the switching costs estimators from methods A and B di¤er by bootstrapping. Our bootstrap
sample is generated using the multinomial logit choice and transition probabilities for each player in
each market in the same manner as a parametric bootstrap; cf. Kasahara and Shimotsu (2008) and
Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007). We use 500 bootstrap samples and report the standard errors
in italics.
Results
We estimate the model twice. Once using the data from before the implementation of the 1990
CAAA and another after. We allow the equilibria over the two time periods to di¤er. But, for
illustrational purposes, we assume the data are generated from the same equilibrium in all markets
within each time period and there is no other source of unobserved heterogeneity.8
Table 4 and 5 compile the results from estimating switching costs using the data from the years
1980 to 1990 and 1991 to 1998 respectively. Tables 6 and 7 give the estimates for the discount
factor and xed operating cost using the data from the corresponding periods. Table 8 compares the
estimates of the sunk entry costs and sunk investment costs.
The signs and relative magnitudes of individually estimated switching costs almost uniformly
make sensible economic sense. E.g., by reading down the columns in Tables 4 and 5, we see that
entering at higher capacity level generally implies higher cost (negative payo¤), and increasing the
capacity level should be costly while divestment can return revenue for rms. This is quite an
impressive nding in particular for Method B, which shows that the observed probabilities alone can
generate switching costs estimates that capture well some key features of a complicated structural
model. The switching cost estimates from both Methods A and B are similar. The Wald statistics do
not nd the two switching costs estimators to be statistically di¤erent.9 Therefore we do not reject the
capacity constrained Cournot game specication based on comparing the switching costs estimates.
8Recently Otsu, Pesendorfer and Takahashi (2015) propose several tests to detect di¤erences in the probability
distribution of data across markets. If a test rejects then there is evidence data across markets should not be pooled
together, which can point to possible violation of single equilibrium assumption and/or misspecication in terms of
omitting other unobserved heterogeneity. They actually suggest Ryans data in general should not be pooled together
across markets. In particular there is a strong evidence against pooling data between 1980 and 1990, while the data
from 1991 to 1998 did not get rejected by some of their poolability tests.
9Our test statistic takes a standard quadratic form of the di¤erence between the switching costs estimates from
methods A and B. Its asymptotic distribution under the null hypothesis (of no di¤erence) is a Chi-squared random
variable with 25 degree of freedoms.
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Comparing Tables 4 and 5 shows the entry and switching costs increase after the implementation of
1990 CAAA. Higher entry costs is a key nding in Ryans paper as new entrants face more stringent
regulations than incumbents. An increase in switching costs can be partly attributed to the new
plants using newer (or better maintained) equipment that require more certication and testing than
previously.
We nd the discount factor estimates to be around the range that are usually assumed in empirical
work (between 0.9 and 0.95) apart from the estimate using Method B before the 1990 CAAA that
appears close to the boundary.10 Although our estimates suggest rms face a lower borrowing rate
than in Ryan, we do not reject the hypothesis that  = 0:9 as assumed in his paper. We also nd a
small increase in the xed operating costs after the implementation of 1990 CAAA.
Finally Table 8 reports sunk costs using di¤erent estimation methods. The estimates from Meth-
ods A and B can be found by computing SCa0!a SCa!a0 using individual switching costs in Tables
4 and 5. The N-N approach estimates the same object without the assumption that the payo¤ is
zero upon choosing action 0. The signs and magnitudes of the sunk cost estimates are plausible. We
nd the sunk investment costs between any two capacity levels increase as the gap between levels
grow, while we nd the costs to be of similar magnitude when compared within the same capacity
di¤erence bands. We also nd the sunk costs to have increased after the implementation of 1990
CAAA.
10The innite time expected discounted payo¤s with respect to each action is unbounded with  = 1. However, the
di¤erences between diverge very slowly when we approximate them with a Neumann sum, and the objective function
appears to be well-dened numerically even as  is very close to 1.
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Method A
ait 1 = 0 ait 1 = 1 ait 1 = 2 ait 1 = 3 ait 1 = 4 ait 1 = 5
ait = 1 -3.300 - 2.265 5.080 7.956 10.770
0.985 - 0.680 0.707 0.766 0.929
ait = 2 -10.502 -5.243 - 5.528 10.609 15.810
0.937 0.719 - 0.887 0.998 1.117
ait = 3 -23.266 -15.439 -7.624 - 7.996 16.050
1.405 1.010 0.683 - 0.923 1.237
ait = 4 -41.023 -30.620 -20.196 -9.808 - 11.648
2.003 1.850 1.430 1.094 - 1.442
ait = 5 -52.879 -50.648 -39.027 -25.756 -11.949 -
2.281 2.585 2.041 1.395 1.537 -
Method B
ait 1 = 0 ait 1 = 1 ait 1 = 2 ait 1 = 3 ait 1 = 4 ait 1 = 5
ait = 1 -2.776 - 2.540 5.333 8.014 11.696
0.269 - 0.333 0.567 0.967 1.113
ait = 2 -10.483 -5.197 - 5.243 10.466 15.893
0.689 0.365 - 0.368 0.718 1.110
ait = 3 -23.279 -15.427 -7.769 - 7.732 16.134
1.339 0.920 0.474 - 0.640 1.006
ait = 4 -41.422 -31.007 -20.797 -10.416 - 10.852
1.808 1.594 1.078 0.682 - 0.864
ait = 5 -54.378 -52.892 -41.874 -28.792 -16.091 -
1.911 2.232 1.844 1.659 1.835 -
Specication Test
Statistic 14.069
p-value 0.961
Table 4: Results from estimating switching costs using data from the years 1980 to 1990.
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Method A
ait 1 = 0 ait 1 = 1 ait 1 = 2 ait 1 = 3 ait 1 = 4 ait 1 = 5
ait = 1 -6.962 - 4.449 9.881 15.125 20.264
1.530 - 1.514 1.501 1.689 1.634
ait = 2 -17.038 -8.291 - 9.872 18.531 26.722
1.723 1.364 - 1.714 1.860 1.527
ait = 3 -35.489 -23.412 -11.411 - 12.961 24.283
2.444 1.866 1.371 - 1.955 1.614
ait = 4 -51.544 -50.043 -33.220 -16.363 - 16.524
3.061 3.419 3.278 2.825 - 3.561
ait = 5 -64.018 -63.994 -61.481 -48.514 -24.374
4.514 4.524 4.502 3.683 2.056
Method B
ait 1 = 0 ait 1 = 1 ait 1 = 2 ait 1 = 3 ait 1 = 4 ait 1 = 5
ait = 1 -5.653 - 5.294 10.730 16.264 21.567
0.726 - 0.704 1.109 1.703 1.378
ait = 2 -17.746 -9.278 - 8.774 17.461 25.754
1.379 0.780 - 0.857 1.364 1.218
ait = 3 -36.098 -24.537 -11.950 - 11.862 23.489
2.282 1.767 1.128 - 1.221 1.401
ait = 4 -51.840 -50.425 -33.468 -16.760 - 16.753
2.202 2.649 2.397 1.904 - 2.025
ait = 5 -64.236 -64.355 -61.706 -48.272 -24.093
6.712 6.771 6.713 5.695 3.389
Specication Test
Statistic 13.196
p-value 0.975
Table 5: Results from estimating switching costs using data from the years 1991 to 1998.
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Method A
Discount Factor Operating Cost
0.956 -1.679
0.084 0.489
Method B
Discount Factor Operating Cost
0.999 -1.523
0.075 0.649
Table 6: Results from estimating the discount factor and xed operating cost using data from the
years 1980 to 1990.
Method A
Discount Factor Operating Cost
0.938 -2.079
0.162 1.10
Method B
Discount Factor Operating Cost
0.946 -1.893
0.160 0.948
Table 7: Results from estimating the discount factor and xed operating cost using data from the
years 1991 to 1998.
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Before After
ait ait 1 Method A Method B N-N Method A Method B N-N
1 0 3.30 2.78 2.78 6.96 5.65 5.66
0.36 0.27 0.27 1.53 0.73 0.70
2 0 10.50 10.48 10.48 17.04 17.75 17.74
0.94 0.69 0.69 1.72 1.38 1.49
3 0 23.27 23.28 23.28 35.49 36.10 36.10
1.41 1.34 1.34 2.44 2.28 2.18
4 0 41.02 41.42 41.42 51.54 51.84 51.83
2.00 1.81 1.80 3.06 2.20 1.61
5 0 52.88 54.38 54.25 64.02 64.24 64.22
2.28 1.91 2.00 4.51 6.71 6.34
2 1 2.98 2.66 2.44 3.84 3.98 3.30
1.22 2.54 0.25 0.31 0.61 0.36
3 2 2.10 2.53 2.56 1.54 3.18 3.22
1.18 2.30 0.26 0.30 0.73 0.33
4 3 1.81 2.68 2.58 3.40 4.90 4.81
1.52 4.33 0.28 0.42 2.45 0.50
5 4 0.30 5.24 2.87 7.85 7.34 7.30
2.50 4.75 0.33 1.74 4.58 2.14
3 1 10.36 10.09 10.01 13.53 13.81 13.05
1.22 2.12 0.75 0.79 1.24 0.98
4 2 9.59 10.33 10.29 14.69 16.01 16.07
1.54 3.31 0.77 0.81 2.13 1.25
5 3 9.71 12.66 10.91 24.23 24.78 24.21
1.45 4.83 0.91 1.37 6.09 5.22
4 1 22.66 22.99 22.76 34.92 34.16 34.02
1.78 3.29 1.37 1.45 1.93 1.42
5 2 23.22 25.98 24.05 34.76 35.95 34.79
1.83 4.64 1.79 1.59 6.89 6.34
5 1 39.88 41.20 40.21 43.73 42.79 41.67
2.40 4.68 2.60 2.08 6.82 6.40
Table 8: Results from estimating the sunk entry and investment costs.
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6 Concluding Remarks
We show the discount factor can be identied jointly with the payo¤ function under the linear-in-
parameter specication. The key property we exploit is the conditional linearity of the choice-specic
value functions for a given value of the discount factor. The discount factor can in fact be identied
even if the payo¤ parameters cannot be identied. This has an important implication since many
empirical problems have to normalize parts of the payo¤ parameters. Our result shows the discount
factor can be identied independently of these normalization choices.
We also contribute to a recent interest in the robust identication of combinations of switching
costs without any normalization as studied in Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014); also see Kaloupt-
sidi, Scott, and Souza-Rodrigues (2016a, 2016b). We provide closed-form identication results on
switching costs that do not depend on the knowledge of the discount factor and other parts of the
payo¤ function. We show some costs, such as sunk entry and investment costs, can be identied
in this way. We show the same combinations of switching costs can be identied for linear models
in two steps. In the rst step some normalization is made in order to identify each switching cost
individually. Even when an incorrect normalization is used, thus the implied switching costs are
incorrect individually, we show certain combinations of these costs can still be correctly identied.
Our parametric and nonparametric identication approaches deliver substantially di¤erent avors
of results. But there are overlapping implications when the payo¤function satises both Assumptions
N and P, as we then have two di¤erent ways to identify the switching costs. However, there are notable
distinctions where our nonparametric results remain valid but the analysis under Assumption P is
no longer appropriate. First, a researcher may want to use a nonlinear parametric specication on
parts of the payo¤s outside of the switching costs. One example of this is to impose positivity on
the variable prots. Our nonparametric identication results do not depend on the specication of
the variable prot function. Second, our nonparametric identication strategy holds pointwise for
each observed state. Therefore it is immediately applicable for models with continuous states; e.g.
see Srisuma and Linton (2012).
Finally our main message is that one should generally attempt to identify and estimate the
discount factor in dynamic decision problems and games. Clearly we do not expect the linear spec-
ication to be necessary for identication. But analyzing models with nonlinear parametric pay-
o¤ functions will be substantially more di¢ cult. Similarly, outside of discrete choice models, e.g.
for games with supermodular payo¤ functions (see Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) and Srisuma
(2013)), joint identication and estimation of the discount factor and payo¤ parameters should also
be possible. However, in this case even the practical implementation can be burdensome when the
payo¤ functions take a linear-in-parameter structure.
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Appendix
The Appendix contains two parts. A.1 extends the results on identication of switching costs to
dynamic games. A.2 provides a su¢ cient condition for the identication of the discount factor. Since
the single agent decision problem is a special case of a game, we also present the results in A.2 in
the context of a game.
A.1 Identication of the Switching Costs in Dynamic Games
We shall keep our description of the basic elements of the game very brief. The notation we use
directly extends what we describe in Sections 2 and 3. Consider a game with I players, indexed
by i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ig. The random variables in the game are the actions: at  (ait; a it) 2 AI ,
A = f0; 1; : : : ; Jg; past actions wt  (wit; w it) 2 AI ; sit  (wt; xt; "it) 2 AI  X  RJ+1, where
X = f1; : : : ; Kg, and "it  ("it (0) ; : : : ; "it (J)) 2 RJ+1; and we let st  (wt; xt; "1t; : : : ; "It).
In an equilibrium ait = i (sit) for all i, such that
i (si) = max
ai2A
fE[ui (ait; a it; si) jsit = si; ait = ai] + E [Vi (sit+1) jsit = si; ait = ai]g; (20)
where ui and Vi are player is payo¤ and value function respectively; in particular
Vi (si) =
1X
t=0
tE [ui (ait; a it; sit) jsi0 = si] :
Assumption MN updates Assumptions M and N for games.
Assumption MN:
(i) (Additive Separability) For all ai; a i; w; x; "i:
ui (ai; a i; w; x; "i) = i (ai; a i; w; x) + "i (ai) :
(ii) (Conditional Independence I) The transition distribution of the states has the following fac-
torization for all x0; "0; x; "; a:
P (x0; "0jx; "; w; a) =
IY
i=1
Qi ("
0
i)G (x
0jx;w; a) ;
where Qi is the cumulative distribution function of "it and G denotes the transition law of xt+1
conditioning on xt; at. Furthermore, "it has nite rst moments, and a positive, continuous and
bounded density on RJ+1.
(iii) (Finite Observed State) X = f1; : : : ; Kg.
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(iv) (Decomposition of Prots): For all a; w; x:
i (ai; a i; w; x; ") = i (ai; a i; x) + i (ai   wi; w i; x) ;
such that i (0; w i; x) = 0.
(v) (Conditional Independence II): The distribution of xt+1 conditional on at and xt is indepen-
dent of wt.
Beside from explicitly separating out past actions from other observed state variables, MN(i) to
MN(iii) are standard in the dynamic discrete choice game literature; e.g. see Aguirregabiria and
Mira (2007), Bajari et al. (2007), Pakes and Berry (2007), and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler
(2008). MN(iv) extends N(i). It assumes that strategic interactions can a¤ect payo¤s in i directly
but not i, while past actions enter i but not i. The exclusion restrictions we impose are quite
natural for components of i such as per-period variable prots and operation costs, while switching
costs that occur for each player are determined by her own actions. It will be useful to sometimes
represent the switching cost using a more intuitive notation (cf. equation (11)):
i (ai   wi; w i; x) = SCwi!aii (w i; x) :
MN(v) is a direct extension of N(ii).
As with the single agent case, our identication study will be based on the choice-specic value
function:
vi (ai; w; x) = E [i (ai; a it; wt; x) jwt = w; xt = x] + E [Vi (st+1) jwt = w; xt = x; at = a] ;
which can be recover from:
Pr [ait = aijwt = w; xt = x] = Pr [vi (ai; w; x) vi (a0i; w; x) > "it (a0i)  "it (ai) for all a0i 6= ai] ;
wherevi (ai; w; x)  vi (ai; w; x) vi (0; w; x). Let also, i (ai; a i; x)  i (ai; a i; x) i (0; a i; x)
and i (ai; w; x)  i (ai   wi; w i; x)  i ( wi; w i; x). Lemma 4 is a generalization of Lemma 1.
Lemma 4: Under Assumption MN, we have for all i; ai > 0 and w; x:
vi (ai; w; x) = E [i (ai; a it; x) jwt = w; xt = x] + i (ai; w; x) ;
where,
i (ai; a i; x)  i (ai; a i; x)  i (0; a i; x) +  (emi (ai; a i; x)  emi (0; a i; x)) ;emi (ai; a i; x)  E [mi (wt+1; xt+1) jait = ai; a it = a i; xt = x] ;
mi (w; x)  E [Vi (sit) jwt = w; xt = x] :
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Proof: Follows immediately from applying the law of iterated expectations (cf. the proof of
Lemma 1).
Since we have nite actions and states, we can collect vi (ai; w; x) across w for each (i; ai; x)
into a vector of size (J + 1)I . Using a matrix form, we have:
vi (ai; x) = Zi (x) i (ai; x) + Qi (ai; x)i (ai; x) ; (21)
wherevi (ai; x) = (vi (ai; w; x))w2AI , i (ai; x) = (i (ai; a i; x))a i2AI 1 , Zi (x) represents the
matrix of conditional probabilities for computing a conditional expectation of a it given (wt = w; xt = x),
Qi (ai; x)i (ai; x) represents (i (ai; w; x))a2AI with i (ai; x) = (i (ai   wi; w i; x))wi2A;w i2AI 1
and Qi (ai; x) is a matrix of indicators (consisting of 0s and 1s) that pick up switching costs as
appropriate.
Theorem 3 generalizes the closed-form identication of switching costs in Theorem 1 for dynamic
games.
Theorem 3: Assume that Assumption MN holds. Let D be an `1  (J + 1)I matrix with
(D) = `1 such that (J + 1)
I 1 < `1  (J + 1)I . Denote DZi (x) by eZ and (eZ) by `2. Suppose
also DQi (ai; x)i = eQe+0 for some `3 dimensional vectors e and 0 that consist of elements,
possibly combinations, of i such that `3  `1   `2, and eQ is an `1  `3 matrix with (eQ) = `3. If
([eZ : eQ]) = `2 + `3 then,
e = (eQ>ePeQ) 1 eQ>eP (Dvi (ai; x)  0) : (22)
where eP = I`1   eZ(eZ>eZ)yeZ>.
Before presenting the proof to Theorem 3 some explanations on the notations will be useful.
The crucial interpretation of our result rests on the relation: DQi (ai; x)i = eQe + 0. The goal
of Theorem 3 is to identify components, or combinations, of (i (ai; w; x))w2AI using choice-specic
value functions in equation (21) for a given (i; ai; x). We denote the object of interest by e. We use
0 to account for components of switching costs that can be identied outside the dynamic model
from the data or by normalization. Therefore (D; eQ) are user-chosen matrices and are completely
known. For identication, we can also treat eZi as known since Zi (x) is a matrix of observed choice
probabilities.
Proof of Theorem 3.
Note that `3  1 since `2  minf`1; (Zi (x))g and (Zi (x))  (J + 1)I 1. Multiply equation
(21) by D yields,
Dvi (ai; x) = eZi (ai; x) + eQe+ 0:
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By assumption, ePeQ has full column rank. The result then follows from projecting vi (ai; x) or-
thogonally onto the null space of eZ and solve out for ei.
One systematic approach to apply Theorem 3 in practice is to rst write out the matrix equation
(21). Then choose D so that DQi (ai; x)i contains the switching costs of interest, and deneeQe + 0 appropriately. We now illustrate this identifying strategy with a two-player binary choice
game for di¤erent types of switching costs.
For notational compactness we will suppress xt and assume that SCw!ai (w i) is the same for
all w i. We use i (wi; w i)  vi (1; wi; w i)   vi (0; wi; w i), p i (w)  Pr [a it = 1jwt = w], and
i (a i)  i (1; a i). Then equation (21) represents:266664
vi (0; 0)
vi (0; 1)
vi (1; 0)
vi (1; 1)
377775 =
266664
1  p i (0; 0)
1  p i (0; 1)
1  p i (1; 0)
1  p i (1; 1)
p i (0; 0)
p i (0; 1)
p i (1; 0)
p i (1; 1)
377775
"
i (0)
i (1)
#
+
266664
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
377775
"
SC0!1i
 SC1!0i
#
: (23)
In particular we have
Qi (ai; x)i =
266664
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
377775
"
SC0!1i
 SC1!0i
#
:
We consider three examples of potential objects of interest.
Example 1: Sunk entry cost
Suppose we want to identify  SC0!1i  SC1!0i that represents the sunk entry cost in the context
of an entry game. We can subtract vi (0; 0) from the rst equation in (23) o¤ the remaining three
equations. This yields2664
vi (0; 1)
vi (1; 0)
vi (1; 1)
3775 =
2664
p i (0; 0)  p i (0; 1)
p i (0; 0)  p i (1; 0)
p i (0; 0)  p i (1; 1)
p i (0; 1)  p i (0; 0)
p i (1; 0)  p i (0; 0)
p i (1; 1)  p i (0; 0)
3775
"
i (0)
i (1)
#
+
2664
0
1
1
3775  SC0!1i   SC1!0i  :
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In particular, in this case,
eZ =
2664
p i (0; 0)  p i (0; 1)
p i (0; 0)  p i (1; 0)
p i (0; 0)  p i (1; 1)
p i (0; 1)  p i (0; 0)
p i (1; 0)  p i (0; 0)
p i (1; 1)  p i (0; 0)
3775 ;
D =
2664
 1 1 0 0
 1 0 1 0
 1 0 0 1
3775 ; eQ =
2664
0
1
1
3775 ; e =  SC0!1i   SC1!0i , and 0 = 0:
The sunk entry cost can then be identied by the expression in equation (22).
Example 2: Menu cost under symmetry
Suppose we want to identify SC0!1i under the assumption that SC
0!1
i = SC
1!0
i . Then equation
(23) becomes266664
vi (0; 0)
vi (0; 1)
vi (1; 0)
vi (1; 1)
377775 =
266664
1  p i (0; 0)
1  p i (0; 1)
1  p i (1; 0)
1  p i (1; 1)
p i (0; 0)
p i (0; 1)
p i (1; 0)
p i (1; 1)
377775
"
i (0)
i (1)
#
+
266664
1
1
 1
 1
377775 SC0!1i  :
In this case
eZ =
266664
1  p i (0; 0)
1  p i (0; 1)
1  p i (1; 0)
1  p i (1; 1)
p i (0; 0)
p i (0; 1)
p i (1; 0)
p i (1; 1)
377775 ;D = I4; eQ =
266664
1
1
 1
 1
377775 ; e = SC0!1i , and 0 = 0:
Example 3: Switching Costs with Normalizations
Suppose we want to identify SC0!1i under the assumption that SC
0!1
i = c0. For example, we
may be interested in identifying the entry cost under the assumption that the scrap value is c0. Then
equation (23) becomes266664
vi (0; 0)
vi (0; 1)
vi (1; 0)
vi (1; 1)
377775 =
266664
1  p i (0; 0)
1  p i (0; 1)
1  p i (1; 0)
1  p i (1; 1)
p i (0; 0)
p i (0; 1)
p i (1; 0)
p i (1; 1)
377775
"
i (0)
i (1)
#
+
266664
1
1
0
0
377775 SC0!1i +
266664
0
0
 c0
 c0
377775 :
In this case
eZ =
266664
1  p i (0; 0)
1  p i (0; 1)
1  p i (1; 0)
1  p i (1; 1)
p i (0; 0)
p i (0; 1)
p i (1; 0)
p i (1; 1)
377775 ;D = I4; eQ =
266664
1
1
0
0
377775 ; e = SC0!1i , and 0 =
266664
0
0
 c0
 c0
377775 :
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In order to obtain the sunk costs when the number of actions is larger than two one has to combine
identiable objects across actions, e.g. see Corollary 2. Identication of objects for each action can
be obtained as the examples above have shown. We use Theorem 3 to estimate the games such as
those in our simulation study and the empirical model of capacity game in Section 5 of our paper.
A.2 A Su¢ cient Condition for Identication of the Discount Factor
In this part of the appendix we give a more analytical approach that ensures identication of the
discount factor and payo¤parameters in a dynamic game context. We rst introduce some additional
notations.
For any x = (x1; : : : ; xp)
> 2 Rp and y = (y1; : : : ; yp+1)> 2 Rp+1, let kxk1 = maxi=1;:::;p jxij and
kyk2 = maxi=1;:::;p jyij + jyp+1j. Then for a class of p + 1 by p real matrices, we denote the matrix
norms induced by
 kk1 ; kk2 by kk1;2 . We comment that these are not standard induced matrix
norms, however they have simple explicit bounds. In particular it is easy to verify that, for any matrix
(p+ 1) p, C = (cij),
kCk1;2  maxi=1;:::;p
pX
j=1
jcijj+
pX
j=1
jcp+1;jj :
We also need the parameter space to be compact. Let    2  : maxi=1;:::;p jij  k	 and B 
0; b

for some positive k and b 2 (0; 1).
Next we generalize the setup of Section 4 to dynamic games. The following is a straightforward
extension of Assumptions M and P.
Assumption MP:
(i) (Additive Separability) For all ai; a i; x; "i:
ui (ai; a i; x; "i; ) = i (ai; a i; x; ) + "i (ai) :
(ii) (Conditional Independence I) The transition distribution of the states has the following fac-
torization for all x0; "0; x; "; a:
P (x0; "0jx; "; w; a) =
IY
i=1
Qi ("
0
i)G (x
0jx;w; a) ;
where Qi is the cumulative distribution function of "it and G denotes the transition law of xt+1
conditioning on xt; at. Furthermore, "it has nite rst moments, and a positive, continuous and
bounded density on RJ+1.
(iii) (Finite Observed State) X = f1; : : : ; Kg.
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(iv) (Linear-in-Parameters): For all ai; a i; x; "i:
i (ai; a i; x; ) = i0 (ai; a i; x) + 
>i1 (ai; a i; x) ;
where i0 is a known real value function, i1 is a known p dimensional vector value function and 
belongs to Rp.
Our analysis will be based on the parameterized choice-specic value function:
vi (ai; x; ; ) = E [i (ai; a it; x; ) jxt = x] + E [Vi (st+1; ; ) jxt = x; ait = ai] ; where
Vi (si; ; ) =
1X
t=0
tE [ui (ait; a it; sit; ) jsi0 = si] :
Let vi (ai; x; ; )  vi (ai; x; ; )   vi (0; x; ; ). We can use vi from all players to dene an
empirical model and the corresponding notion of identication, and observationally equivalence, as
in Section 4. We will omit this discussion to avoid repetition.
Our starting point will be the following lemma that generalizes Lemma 2.
Lemma 5: Under Assumption MP, we have for all i; ai > 0, v
ai
i (; )  (vi (ai; x; ; ))x2X
can collected in the following vector form for all (; ) 2 B :
vaii (; ) = R
ai
i0 + H
ai
i (IK   L) 1 Ri0 (24)
+
 
Raii1 + H
ai
i (IK   L) 1 Ri1


+Haii (IK   L) 1 i;
where the elements in the above display are collected and explained in Tables C and D.
Matrix Dimension Representing
Raii1 K  p E [i1 (ai; a it; xt)  i1 (0; a it; xt) jxt = ]
R1 K  p E [i1 (at; xt) jxt = ]
L K K E[ (xt+1) jxt = ]
Haii K K E[ (xt+1) jxt = ; ait = ai]
Haii K K E[ (xt+1) jxt = ; ait = ai]  E[ (xt+1) jxt = ; ait = 0]
Table C. The matrices consist of (di¤erences in) expected payo¤s and probabilities. The latter
represent conditional expectations for any function  of xt+1.
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Vector Representing
i E ["it (ait)jxt = ]
Raii0 E [i0 (ai; a it; xt)  i0 (0; a it; xt) jxt = ]
Ri0 E [i0 (at; xt) jxt = ]
(IK   iL) 1 Rij
P1
t=0 
tE[ij (at; xt) jx0 = ]
Haii (IK   iL) 1 Rij
P1
t=0 
t (E[ij (at; xt) jai0 = ai; x0 = ]  E[ij (at; xt) jai0 = 0; x0 = ])
Haii (IK   iL) 1 i
P1
t=0 
t (E ["t (at)j ai0 = ai; x0 = ]  E ["t (at)j ai0 = 0; x0 = ])
Table D. The K  1 vectors represent (di¤erences in) expected payo¤s.
Our strategy to show identication is to re-write Lemma 5 in order to set up a mapping that has
the data generating parameters its xed-point. One desired relation is the following.
Lemma 6: Under Assumption MP, (; ) is observationally equivalent to (0; 0) if and only if
(; ) satises
caii  Daii ()    Ei () = Faii
 


!
(25)
for all i; ai > 0, where
caii = v
ai
i (0; 0) Raii0 ;
Daii () = H
ai
i (IK   L) 1 Ri1;
Ei () = 
2Haii L (IK   L) 1 (Ri0 + i) ;
Faii = [R
ai
i1 : H
ai
i (Ri0+i)] :
Proof: Equation (25) is obtained by re-arranging equation (24), after applying the identity
that (IK   L) 1 = IK + L (IK   L) 1 and replace vaii (; ) by vaii (0; 0). Therefore, by
construction, (; ) satises (24) if and only if it is observationally equivalent to (0; 0).
The following result provides one condition that is su¢ cient for the identication of (0; 0).
Theorem 4: Assume that K  p+ 1 and Assumption MP holds. Suppose there exists i; ai such
that: (i) the rank of Faii is p + 1; (ii) there exists a p + 1 by K matrix A0 such that A0F
ai
i is
non-singular; and (iii) max fg1;g2g < 1, where
g1 = max
2B
(A0Faii ) 1 A0Haii  (IK   L) 1 R1i1;2 ;
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g2 = max
;02B;2
(A0Faii ) 1 A0Haii
 
(IK   L) 1 (IK   0L) 1 R1i
+L (IK   L) 1 (( + 0) IK   0L) (IK   0L) 1 (R0i + i)
!
1;2
:
Then (0; 0) is identiable.
Proof: First dene Qaii : [0; 1]k ! Rp+1 as follows:
Qaii (; ) = (A0Faii ) 1 A0caii   (A0Faii ) 1 A0Daii ()    (A0Faii ) 1 A0Ei () :
By construction, from (25), it is easy to see that (0; 0) is a xed-point ofQ. Take any (; ) ; (0; 0) 2
B , then
Qaii (; ) Qaii (0; 0) =   (A0Faii ) 1 A0 (Daii ()   Daii (0) 0 + Ei ()  Ei (0)) ;
where
Daii ()   Daii (0) 0 = Haii

 (IK   L) 1 Ri1   0 (IK   0L) 1 Ri10

= Haii
 
(   0) (IK   L) 1 (IK   0L) 1 Ri1
+0 (IK   0L) 1 Ri1 (   0)
!
;
and
Ei ()  Ei (0) = Haii L

2 (IK   L) 1   02 (IK   0L) 1

(Ri0 + i)
= Haii L

(   0) (IK   L) 1 (( + 0) IK   0L) (IK   0L) 1

(Ri0 + i) ;
which can be shown by making use of the following identities:
 (IK   L) 1   0 (IK   0L) 1 = (   0) (IK   L) 1 (IK   0L) 1 ;
2 (IK   L) 1   02 (IK   0L) 1 = (   0) (IK   L) 1 (( + 0) IK   0L) (IK   0L) 1 :
It then follows that
jQaii (; ) Qaii (0; 0)j  g1 k   0k1 + g2 j   0j
 max fg1;g2g

 


!
 
 
0
0
!
2
:
I.e. Qaii is a contraction, hence it has a unique xed point. Now suppose (0; 0) is not identiable.
Then there exists some (; ) 6= (0; 0) that is observationally equivalent to (0; 0). By an impli-
cation of Lemma 6 (; ) must also be a xed point of Qaii , which is a contradiction. Thus (0; 0)
is identiable.
Comments on Theorem 4:
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(i) Compact Domain. B cannot include 1 as the expected discounted returns would then be
unbounded. Compactness is useful for showing existence of a xed point. There is also a trade-o¤ in
the choice of b and k in the denitions of B and  respectively. For example, smaller b and k means
smaller max fg1;g2g but this is a restriction on the parameter space.
(ii) Choice of A0. The need to select A0 can be eliminated altogether by removing some rows
in (25) so that we have exactly p + 1 equations. In fact it is not necessary to take equations that
only correspond to the states from a particular player i and ai. Since the parametric structure in
(25) is the same for all states we can select any p+ 1 equations from any i and ai and compute the
corresponding matrix norms for g1 and g2. This gives us di¤erent combinations of equations we can
use, and we only need the analog of max fg1;g2g to be less than 1 for one of them to ensure (0; 0)
is identiable.
(iii) Rank Deciency. We have emphasized in Section 4 that sometimes not all components
of the payo¤ functions can be identied and normalizations are necessary. For example in the
entry/exit game generally the entry cost and scrap value cannot be jointly identied. Then one
may consider normalizing, say, the scrap value in order to estimate all the other parameters in
the model. Furthermore, we discussed in Section 4.3 that the discount factor can be identied
even if an incorrect normalization is used. Relatedly, we can also relax condition (i) in Theorem
4 in this direction and allow Faii to be rank decient. In particular, recall from (25) that F
ai
i =
[Raii1 : H
ai
i (Ri0+i)], we can allow R
ai
i1 to be rank decient. In such case there exists a full rank
matrixW such thatRaii1W = [eRaii1 : 0] whereeRaii1 has full column rank. Then Faii
 


!
in (25)
becomes
h
eRaii1 : 0 : Haii (Ri0+i)i
 
W 1

!
. Therefore, by inspection, the proof of Theorem 4
can be readily adapted by reparameterizing  to show the identication of the discount factor is
possible.
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